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Federal Jurisdiction in Diversity and
Related Cases
W. J. Wagner*
A N IMPORTANT GROUP OF CASES over which the inferior federal
courts in the United States have jurisdiction consists of
those in which the parties are "citizens of different States."
Theoretically, it cannot be doubted that controversies "arising
under" federal law are proper for adjudication in federal courts,
while the necessity of extending the federal judicial power to di-
versity cases is not readily apparent. However, while Congress
withdrew from the original jurisdiction of federal courts cases
"arising under" until 1875, it vested in them diversity jurisdiction,
to be exercised concurrently with the state courts, by the very
first Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided as follows:
"... (T) he circuit courts shall have original cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits
of a civil nature . . . where . . . the suit is between a citizen
of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another
State." 1
In 1875, jurisdiction was extended to cover all cases provided
for by the Constitution; the Act repeated the constitutional
words: ". . . between citizens of different States . . ." 2 The Ju-
dicial Code of 1948 did not change this phraseology.3
Obviously, diversity jurisdiction is based upon the premise
that state courts may not always be impartial in passing upon
cases in which one party is a local citizen, and the other-a resi-
dent of another State. To repeat the language of Justice Story:
".*. (S) tate attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and
state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be sup-
posed to obstruct or to control, the regular administration of
justice." 4
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. This article is
almost an entire chapter from the author's forthcoming book entitled
Federal States and their Judiciary.
1 1 Stat. 73, 78 (Sec. 11).
2 18 Stat. 470 (Sec. 1).
3 28 U. S. C. A., See. 1332.
4 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. (14 U. S.) 304, 347 (1816). For similar
statements by Chief Justice Marshall, see Bank of the United States v.
Deveaux, 5 Cranch (9 U. S.) 61, 87 (1809).
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Of course, if the basic premise of the diversity jurisdiction is
false, the whole idea should fall. The soundness of the premise is
difficult to assess by any means; conclusions must rest on
suppositions and guesses.5 No wonder, advisability of diversity
jurisdiction was and still is being discussed. It was disputed in
the state convention on ratification of the Constitution. One of its
outstanding advocates was Madison, who stated, during the de-
bates in the Virginia convention, that "foreigners cannot get jus-
tice done them" in the local courts; this observation was intended
to cover aliens as well as residents of other sister States.6 It has
been asserted, however, that there is no proof of any bias in the
state courts against non-residents, that there is no reason to as-
sume it, and that, therefore, the necessity of diversity jurisdiction
may be doubted.7
The attacks on diversity jurisdiction culminated in sug-
gestions to abolish it. In 1930 and 1932, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee accepted this idea, and reported bills to that effect.
5 Justice W. 0. Douglas, in We the Judges 84 (1956), stated that at the
formation of the Union, "(t)he jealousies among the States, the suspicions
and hostilities which the citizens of one State had toward those of another,
the prevailing doubts that a Pennsylvania creditor would get justice in a
New England court-these created a feeling of insecurity that was not con-
genial to the mercantile and commercial interests." However, "as the dec-
ades have passed," the situation changed considerably (at 95).
6 J. P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 3, 27 (1948).
7 H. J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of the Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv.
L. Rev. 483 (1928); F. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between
United States and State Courts, 13 Cornell L. Q. 499, 523-530 (1928). A
strong plea for the retention of diversity jurisdiction was written by H. E.
Yntema and G. H. Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction,
79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 869 (1931); the reply of Professor F. Frankfurter, A Note
on Diversity Jurisdiction-in reply to Professor Yntema, was published
in 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1097 (1931). The author advocated putting an
end to "abuses" of diversity jurisdiction by legislation. The discussion con-
tinued, particularly in the A. B. A. J. in 1932 and 1933. Hon. J. J. Parker,
in The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 A. B. A. J. 433
(1932), stressed sovereignty as an argument for diversity jurisdiction, and
again defended it in dual sovereignty and the Federal courts, 51 N. U. L.
Rev. 407, 408-413 (1956). One of the recent pleas for the application of di-
versity jurisdiction in its full scope was given by M. Wendell, Relations
Between the Federal and State Courts (1949). Justice Frankfurter con-
tinues to criticize the diversity jurisdiction in his pronouncements from the
bench. Thus, in Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U. S.
48, 54 (1954), he referred to the allegedly "mounting mischief inflicted on
the federal judicial system by the unjustifiable continuance of diversity
jurisdiction," and asserted that "(a) legal device like that of federal diversity
jurisdiction which is inherently ... not founded on reason, offers constant
temptation to new abuses" (at 56). However, the prevailing sentiment
among the judges is that this jurisdiction should be retained; see report of
a committee in Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Report of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, 271 (1951).
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As it stands today, the diversity jurisdiction covers more in-
stances than necessary to protect the litigants from a possible bias
of state courts in favor of its residents. It was pointed out, e.g.,
that there is no reason for diversity jurisdiction where both
parties to the suit are non-residents.8
By judicial decisions, scores of rules were developed which
help to determine whether diversity jurisdiction lies or not. Many
of them have a restrictive effect on the application of the doctrine.
One of the oldest requirements, going along with the gen-
eral principle that federal jurisdiction is never assumed and must
be clearly established, is that diversity of citizenship must clearly
appear from the record of the case, before the federal court will
agree to adjudicate the dispute on the merits. This idea prompted
the Supreme Court to strike off the docket the early case of
Bingham v. Cabot.9 From the short report of the case it appears
that the Court
"were early of opinion, that it was necessary to set forth
the citizenship (or alienage, where a foreigner was con-
cerned) of the respective parties, in order to bring the case
within the jurisdiction of the circuit court; and that the rec-
ord, in the present case, was in that respect defective." 10
The rule is well settled, and the Supreme Court has indicated
more than once that it has no intention to relax it in any way."
In general, for the purposes of determining federal jurisdic-
tion, citizenship of a State is equivalent to United States citizen-
ship plus a domicile in that State,'12 or residence coupled with an
intention that it be permanent. 13 As in other instances of assump-
tion of jurisdiction, the decisive moment is the one at which the
8 H. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 216, 236-237 (1948). The author takes an inter-
mediate view in the discussion. He opposes strongly the application of the
diversity jurisdiction to cases which are not included in the rationale of
this jurisdiction, but agrees that there is a solid case for preserving it where
state prejudice can be established.
9 Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dall. (3 U. S.) 382 (1798).
10 Ibid., at 383-384.
11 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Fulton Steamboat Co., 6 Wheat. (19 U. S.) 449
(1821). In Cameron v. Hodges, 127 U. S. 322, 325 (1888), the Court said:
"This court has always been very particular in requiring a distinct state-
ment of the citizenship of the parties, and of the particular State in which
it is claimed, in order to sustain the jurisdiction of [the federal] courts."
See also a note, Requirement of Federal Appellate Court that Proof of Di-
versity of Citizenship Appear Upon the Record, 24 Col. L. Rev. 397 (1924).
12 Story in Case v. Clarke, 5 Fed. Cas. 254 (C. C. R. I. 1828); Brown v.
Keene, 8 Pet. (33 U. S.) 112 (1834).
13 Marks v. Marks, 75 F. 321 (C. C. Tenn. 1896).
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suit is brought. Once the jurisdiction of a federal court lies, it
continues in later stages of the case, even if subsequently there
is no diversity of citizenship. 14 Federal jurisdiction attaches even
if a party desiring to have his rights passed upon by the courts
manipulates so as to have a case meeting the requirements of di-
versity of citizenship, with the only purpose of having the suit
adjudicated in a federal court, provided that there be no col-
lusion of any kind. The motive of the party in preferring a fed-
eral tribunal is immaterial.15
The courts make efforts to discover whether all the require-
ments for federal jurisdiction have been complied with, in good
faith, by the parties. It happens, however, that they are misled
by devices such as the establishment of a fake domicile, pretended
assignments of claims, or improper joinder of parties.0
As in cases "arising under" federal law, those in which the
parties have different citizenship may be removed, by the defend-
ant, from state courts to federal courts.17
Actions have to be "prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest"; Is but in many cases, a party to the suit is acting in a
representative capacity, such as a trustee, executor, administra-
tor or guardian. The real party in interest does not appear as a
party to the litigation. In such cases, the citizenship of the repre-
sentative is decisive. "If they are personally qualified by their
citizenship to bring suit in the Federal courts, the jurisdiction is
not defeated by the fact that the parties whom they represent may
be disqualified." 19 Jurisdiction depends "upon the relative situa-
tion of the parties named in the record." 20
The rule is different in cases of interpleader. The Judiciary
Act disregards, in such a situation, the citizenship of the plain-
tiff of record, and makes federal jurisdiction dependent upon the
citizenship of the real parties in interest-that of the adverse
claimants to the money or property owed by plaintiff.2
1
14 One of the early cases in which this rule has been established is Conolly
v. Taylor, 2 Pet. (27 U. S.) 556, 565 (1829), in which Marshall said: "Where
there is no change of party, a jurisdiction depending on the condition of the
party is governed by that condition, as it was at the commencement of the
suit."
15 City of Chicago v. Mills, 204 U. S. 321 (1907).
16 For citation of cases and discussion, see e.g. M. Wendell, op. cit. n. 7, at
72.
17 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 1441 (a).
'8 Rule 17(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
19 Coal Company v. Blatchford, 78 U. S. 172, 175 (1870).
20 Ibid., at 175.
21 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 1335.
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Federal jurisdiction may attach also by virtue of state legis-
lation, if the statute permits the real party in interest to be sued
directly, and this party has citizenship different from that of
plaintiff. Thus, the Louisiana Direct Action Statute, held con-
stitutional in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,22
allows injured persons to bring direct actions against liability in-
surance companies that have issued policies contracting to pay
liability imposed on the tort-feasors. A separate cause of action
against the insurer is established. In Lumbermen's Mutual Cas-
ualty Co. v. Elbert,23 the Supreme Court held that even if the
tort-feasor and the injured person are citizens of the same state,
the federal diversity jurisdiction lies if its requirements are satis-
fied as between the injured and the insurer, if the tort-feasor is
not sued.
Except for prohibiting removal of some actions against rail-
roads from state to federal courts 23a Congress has not imposed,
for a long time, any restrictions on the exercise of the diversity
jurisdiction, so as to limit it to specified subject-matters of the
litigation. However, in 1958, an amendment to the Judicial Code
withdrew the right to remove to federal courts civil actions arising
under the workmen's compensation laws of the states.23b
Diversity jurisdiction vests in the federal courts because of
the quality of the parties, not the type of the controversy. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has made exceptions to the diversity
jurisdiction, which do not seem to be warranted either by statutes
or convincing reason. In Barber v. Barber,24 decided a hundred
years ago, the Court said:
"We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of
the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the al-
lowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in
chancery or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one
from bed and board." 25
This general disclaimer of jurisdiction was later extended to
other cases involving domestic relations, such as the custody of
22 Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 66 (1954).
23 Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U. 8. 48 (1954).
23a 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 1445.
23b 28 U. S. C. A., See 1445(c), added on July 25, 1958; see U. S. C. A.,
Supplement for 1959.
24 Barber v. Barber, 21 How. (62 U. S.) 582, 584 (1858).
25 However, in the case before it, the Court sustained federal jurisdiction,
three justices dissenting, as the federal court was asked only to prevent a
state judgment granting alimony from being defeated by fraud.
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children, and also to granting administration of decedent estates,
probate of wills, etc. In such cases federal courts are closed to the
litigants. 2 6
In investing the federal courts with diversity jurisdiction,
the Constitution speaks only about "citizens of different States."
The same expression was used in congressional legislation for
many years. Clearly, the territories and the District of Columbia
are not states, and therefore it was early held that their residents
are not covered by the diversity of citizenship rule. Thus, in
Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey,27 Marshall refused to residents of
the District of Columbia the right to maintain a suit in the federal
Circuit Court for the District of Virginia against a Virginia citi-
zen, as against their claim that the District was a distinct political
society, and therefore a "state," according to the definitions of
writers on general law. Marshall found that "members of the
American confederacy only are the state contemplated in the con-
stitution." 28 He recognized that "it [was] extraordinary, that
the courts of the United States, which are open to aliens, and to
the citizens of every state in the union, should be closed upon [the
residents of the District]." 29 However, he indicated that the
courts could not do anything about it as it would amount to
changing law by a non-legislative body.
For about a century and a half, the situation did not change.
At last Congress decided to do something about it, and enacted
a statute in 1940, by virtue of which diversity jurisdiction vested
in the federal courts in suits "between citizens of the District of
Columbia, the territory of Hawaii, or Alaska and any State or
territory." 30 A similar result is reached in Sec. 1332 (c) of the
Judicial Code of 1948, which provides that " (t) he word 'States,'
as used in this section, includes the Territories and the District
of Columbia." Recently, this section was supplemented by words:
"and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico," and renumbered as
Section 1332 (d). 3a
Undoubtedly, this legislation improved the situation. But, in
view of the clear wording of the Constitution, its validity is sub-
26 H. M. Hart, Jr., and H. Wechsler, in The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 1013-1018 (1953) give a collection of cases dealing with this prob-
lem.
27 Hepburn & Dundas v. Elizey, 2 Cranch (6 U. S.) 443 (1805).
28 Ibid., at 451.
29 Ibid., at 451.
30 54 Stat. 143.
3oa See U. S. C. A., Supp. for 1959.
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ject to doubt.31 In quite a few cases on the point, decided in
lower federal courts, the decisions were conflicting, the majority
holding that the legislation was unconstitutional. In 1949, one of
those cases, National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,3 2
reached the Supreme Court. Plaintiff, a corporation organized
under the laws of the District of Columbia, had its suit against a
Virginia corporation doing business in Maryland dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction of the federal district court. The Court of
Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, by a bare ma-
jority of five to four. Justice Jackson, delivering the opinion of
the Court, based the conclusion that the statute was constitu-
tional on Art. I of the Constitution rather than on Art. III. As
Art. I empowers Congress "to exercise exclusive Legislation in all
Cases whatsoever, over [the] District [of Columbia] ,22 it could
confer on federal courts established under Art. III judicial func-
tions incidental to Art. I.
If on each side of a suit there is just one party, the determi-
nation of the citizenship of plaintiff and defendant is sufficient to
establish or rule out the diversity jurisdiction. But the question
may be more complicated; there may be multiple plaintiffs and
defendants. It may be still more intricate if additional problems,
such as joinder of parties, class suits, real parties in interest, as-
signments, etc., are present. The general rule to be applied in
such situations was announced early by Marshall, in Strawbridge
v. Curtiss (1806).33 It was held that federal jurisdiction does not
lie in a case involving multiple parties, where some plaintiffs and
some defendants were residents of Massachusetts. Said the Chief
Justice that "where the interest is joint, each of the persons con-
cerned in that interest must be competent to sue, or liable to be
sued, in [federal] courts." 34 The rule is today well settled, and
federal courts will not entertain diversity jurisdiction if "one of
the plaintiffs is a citizen of the same state as the defendant" 35 or
vice versa. Every one of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a dif-
ferent State than every one of the defendants.
An exception to the general rule was provided for by Con-
gress in Sec. 1441 (c) of the Judicial Code of 1948. Changing
31 C. W. Bunn, A Brief Survey of the Jurisdiction and Practice of the Courts
of the United States, 48 (1949).
32 National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582 (1949).
33 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch (7 U. S.) 267 (1806).
34 Ibid., at 267.
35 Mitchell, Insurance Commissioner of California, v. Maurer, 293 U. S. 237
(1934).
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
some former legislation, which originated in the Separable Con-
troversy Act of 1866,3 6 the Code provides:
"Whenever a separate or independent claim or cause of
action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is
joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or
causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the dis-
trict court may determine all issues therein, or, in its dis-
cretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its
original jurisdiction."
Obviously, the above provision covers cases between a single
plaintiff and a single defendant, in which some claims based on
federal law are vindicated in the same action with other claims
based on state law. However, the usual situation is the one in-
volving multiple plaintiffs or defendants. Before 1948, the re-
quirement for removal was that one claim in the case could be
singled out from other claims as a "separable" controvesy. The
present statute requires that the controversy be "independent."
This "gives emphasis to congressional intention to require more
complete disassociation between the federally cognizable pro-
ceedings and those cognizable only in state courts before allow-
ing removal." 37 However, the difference between separable
and independent causes of action might seem to be "in degree, not
in kind." s8 Even under the "separate" controversy concept, re-
moval was permitted only if upon it a separate suit could have
been brought in federal courts.a9 As federal courts are permitted,
in their discretion, to adjudicate the entire case, not just the "in-
dependent" claim, they may take jurisdiction of some disputes
between citizens of the same State, involving only points of state
law. The constitutionality of such jurisdiction may be disputed,40
but the Supreme Court has applied the relevant legislative pro-
visions in quite a few cases and has never intimated that they
should be treated as invalid.
Corporations merit special attention. Should they be treated
as mere associations of persons, having no jural personality of
their own, as are partnerships, the determination of the citizen-
ship of each shareholder would be necessary before the decision
36 14 Stat. 306.
37 American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6, 12 (1951).
38 American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 181 F. 2d 845, 846 (1950).
39 E. R. Holmes, The Separable Controversy-A Federal Removal Concept,
12 Miss. L. J. 163, 166 (1939).
40 Note, The Constitutionality of Federal Removal Jurisdiction Over Sepa-
rable Controversies Involving Citizens of the Same State, 94 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 239 (1946).
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on whether federal diversity jurisdiction lies could be reached.
This approach was applied in the early case of the Bank of the
United States v. Deveaux,4 1 where the Supreme Court said:
"That invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere
legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen;
and consequently, cannot sue or be sued in the courts of the
United States, unless the rights of the members, in this re-
spect, can be exercised in their corporate name. If the cor-
poration be considered as a mere faculty, and not as a com-
pany of individuals, who, in transacting their joint concerns,
may use a legal name, they must be excluded from the courts
of the Union." 42
With the extraordinary development of corporations in the
last hundred years, it can readily be seen that by the application
of the Deveaux rule, all important corporations would be ex-
cluded from the federal courts, as having shareholders in all the
States of the Union. It is no wonder that this rule did not sur-
vive for a long time. The approach denounced by the Deveaux
case was accepted in later cases. In The Providence Bank v. Bill-
ings and Pittman,43 the Court said, by way of dictum: "The great
object of an incorporation is, to bestow the character and proper-
ties of individuality on a collective and changing body of men.
This capacity is always given to such a body." And in The Louis-
ville, Cincinnati, and Charleston Rrd. Co. v. Letson,4 4 the Court
held that corporations should be assimilated to citizens of the
State in which they were chartered, with the following comment:
"... (A) corporation created by and doing business in a par-
ticular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes as a
person, although an artificial person, an inhabitant of the
same state, for the purposes of its incorporation, capable of
being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a natural
person." 45
And the Court concluded:
"We confess our inability to reconcile these qualities of a
corporation-residence, habitancy, and individuality, with the
doctrine that a corporation aggregate cannot be a citizen for
the purposes of a suit in the courts of the United States,
41 Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch (9 U. S.) 61 (1808).
42 Ibid., at 86-87.
43 The Providence Bank v. Billings and Pittman, 4 Pet. (29 U. S.) 514, 562
(1830).
44 The Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston Rrd. Co. v. Letson, 2 How.
(43 U. S.) 497 (1844).
45 Ibid., at 558.
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unless in consequence of a residence of all the corporators
being of the state in which the suit is brought. When the
corporation exercises its powers in the state which chartered
it, that is its residence, and such an averment is sufficient to
give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction." 4,
This approach seemed to make sense. The court did not say
that a corporation was a citizen of a State.4 7 It only intimated
that it should be treated as a citizen. In lack of any constitutional
or legislative provisions on the subject, the Court had to find a
solution to the problem. The rule was settled that for the pur-
poses of diversity jurisdiction the state of incorporation granted
to its corporations a status similar to citizenship. This rule still
stands today, but its rationale has changed, in the light of some
decisions of the Supreme Court. Thus, in Ohio and Mississippi
Rrd. Co. v. Wheeler,48 the Court approached the problem in
another way, finding support for its reasoning in allegedly similar
arguments of the Court in the Letson case. It approved of the
legal presumption that the members of a corporation "are citizens
of the State in which alone the corporate body has a legal ex-
istence; and that a suit by or against a corporation . . . must be
presumed to be a suit by or against citizens of the State which
created the corporate body; and . . .no averment or evidence to
the contrary is admissible . . ." 49
This approach is an unnecessary fiction 5° which does not add
anything to the prestige of the law and should be avoided.5 1 It
was applied, however, in later decisions of the Court and still sur-
vives. In the Judicial Code, no general rule is laid down. In one
specific situation the approach of the Letson case is adopted:
"All national banking associations shall, for the purposes
of all other actions by or against them, be deemed citizens
of the States in which they are respectively located." 52
46 Ibid., at 559.
47 However, in Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 445, 453-454
(1874), the Court said: "It has also been held many times, that a corporation
is a citizen of the State by which it is created, and in which its principal
place of business is situated, so far as that it can sue and be sued in the
Federal courts. This Court has repeatedly held that a corporation was a
citizen of the State creating it, within the clause of the Constitution ex-
tending the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to citizens of different States."
4S Ohio and Mississippi Rrd. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black (66 U. S.) 286 (1861).
49 Ibid., at 296.
50 D. 0. McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 1090,
1225 (1943).
51 For an endeavor to rationalize the presumption, see F. Green, Corpora-
tions As Persons, Citizens, and Possessors of Liberty, 94 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
217 (1946).
52 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 1348, second paragraph.
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When a corporation has been organized under the laws of
several States, including the one in which the suit is brought, it
must be regarded as a citizen of the latter State;53 however, the
rule is different if the corporation registered in that State only
because registration was compulsory, and it was necessary to
comply with this requirement before transacting any business in
the State.5 4
Today, in a substantial majority of diversity cases, corpora-
tions are parties to the suit.5 5 It has been asserted that the open-
ing wide of the federal courts to corporations caused much fric-
tion and jealousy between the two sets of courts, resulted in
putting foreign corporations in a situation more favorable than
that of domestic ones,5 6 and that the rule should be changed.57
The Judicial Conference of the United States, called annually by
virtue of a mandate of the Judicial Code,5 s recommended in 1951
that for the purposes of the diversity jurisdiction corporations be
deemed to be citizens both of the State of their incorporation and
of the State in which they have the principal place of business.5 9
In 1955 a bill was introduced in Congress to limit diversity juris-
diction to cases between individuals, excluding corporations.0 0
Congress accepted the recommendation of the Judicial Con-
ference, and in a recent amendment to the Judicial Code provided
that "a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by
which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its
principal place of business." 60a
In a few States attempts were made to curb the right of
foreign corporations to remove suits into federal courts. Thus, a
53 Patch v. Wabash Rrd. Co., 207 U. S. 277 (1907).
54 Southern Ry. Co. v. Allison, 190 U. S. 326 (1903).
55 F. Frankfurter sets the figure at 80%. Op. cit. n. 7, at 523.
56 C. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 90 (1923).
57 Various attempts to change the situation are described in D. 0. Mc-
Govney, op. cit. n. 50, at 1225-1252. See also H. Wechsler, op. cit. n. 8, at
240. A legislative attempt was made in 1931-1932, when Attorney General
Mitchell advanced a bill providing for the treatment of foreign corporations
as citizens of States in which they carry business.
58 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 331: "The Chief Justice of the United States shall
summon annually the chief judges of the judicial circuits to a confer-
ence . ..
59 Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States
27 (1951).
60 H. R. 5007, 84th Congress.
6ta 28 U. S. C. A., § 1332(c), Supp. for 1959.
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Wisconsin statute of 1870 required all fire insurance companies,
incorporated under the laws of the United States or of the sister
States, to agree that they would not remove suits, before they
were permitted to transact any business in Wisconsin. The Su-
preme Court held that the statute was invalid, as it obstructed
the absolute right secured by the Constitution to citizens of other
States to remove their cases into federal courts. Two justices dis-
sented.6'
By virtue of the Judicial Code, federal jurisdiction lies like-
wise in cases between "Citizens of a State, and foreign states or
citizens or subjects thereof," and "Citizens of different States and
in which foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are addi-
tional parties." 62 In the light of constitutional provisions, federal
jurisdiction does not attach to cases between two aliens, and a
provision of the first Judiciary Act of 1789 extending it to any
case in which an alien was a party was held invalid by Chief
Justice Marshall. 6 3 The reason for which suits between aliens
are not within the jurisdiction of federal courts is obvious. The
rationale of this jurisdiction is the fact that local courts may be
biased in favor of the state residents, or even American citizens
of other States in controversies with aliens; but there should be
impartiality when two foreigners litigate. On the other hand, if
the Framers assumed that state courts may be biased against resi-
dents of other States, there was still more reason to protect aliens
against such a bias. The unfair attitude of state courts toward
foreigners, argued Madison in the Virginia Convention, "pre-
vented many wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among
us." 64
Neither the Constitution nor the Judicial Code say anything
about the situation in which one party to a suit is an alien, and
the other-a citizen of the United States, but not of any of the
States, e.g. residing permanently abroad. It seems that by impli-
cation such cases should be included in the federal jurisdiction.
Clearly, cases in which multiple parties from different States
sue or are sued by an alien come within the federal jurisdiction.65
The situation is similar when on one side of a suit there is a
citizen or citizens of a State or some States, and on the other-a
61 Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 445 (1874).
62 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 1332 (a) (2) and (3).
63 Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 5 Cranch (9 U. S.) 303 (1809).
64 J. P. Frank, op. cit. n. 6, at 27.
65 Niccum v. Northern Assur. Co., 17 F. 2d 160 (D. Ind., 1927).
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citizen or citizens of different States plus an alien or aliens. 66
The problem was more difficult if aliens, citizens of the same
foreign state, were additional parties to suits between citizens of
different sister States. Should the general rule of diversity juris-
diction be applied, there would be no federal jurisdiction, in such
cases. However, the clause of the Judicial Code cited above made
an exception in this situation.
Frequent resort to the federal diversity jurisdiction results in
the fact that at least half of the time of the federal district courts
is devoted today to diversity cases.6 7
In order to stop the increase in the number of cases brought
into the federal courts, it was suggested that the jurisdictional
amount be raised. The Judicial Conference of the United States68
recommended in 1951 that the jurisdictional amount be raised, in
diversity of citizenship cases, to $7,500,69 and in 1952 it suggested
raising this amount to $10,000.70 It was estimated that this in-
crease would eliminate about 39% of all diversity contract cases,
and 13% of the personal injury cases.7 1 An amendment to the
Judicial Code of July 25, 1958, raised the jurisdictional amount
in diversity of citizenship and federal question cases to $10,000. 7 2
The diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts does not ex-
tend to cases in which a State of the Union is a party. The Su-
preme Court said:
"A State is not a citizen. And, under the Judiciary Acts
of the United States, it is well settled that a suit between a
State and a citizen or a corporation of another State is not
between citizens of different States." 73
By virtue of Art. III, Sec. 2 (2) of the Constitution, in all
cases "in which a State shall be party," the Supreme Court shall
have original jurisdiction.
The necessity of the diversity jurisdiction in such highly in-
tegrated federal states as Brazil, Argentina or the United States
66 Ryan v. Ohmer, 233 F. 165 (S. D. N. Y., 1916).
67 Concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Lumbermen's Mutual
Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U. S. 48, 58 (1954); the statement is based on
official statistics.
68 See 28 U. S. C. A., § 331.
69 Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States
27 (1951).
70 Ibid. 15 (1952).
71 Report of the Attorney General to the Judicial Conference of the United
States 27 (1955).
72 28 U. S. C. A., §§ 1331 and 1332, Supp. for 1959.
73 Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U. S. 482, 487 (1894).
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may be questioned. However, should a new federation be or-
ganized of nations which until federation were quite independent
and lived their separate lives, it would seem advisable to adopt
it. Account should be taken of the imperfection of human beings
and national biases of the judges. Not only in countries of a low
degree of development, but also in Western Europe these factors,
unconsciously or consciously have such an important influence on
the magistrates that in scores of cases lawyers agree to accept un-
favorable compromises for their clients in very strong cases rather
than risk instituting a suit in a foreign country. Of course, the
establishment of a federation in Western Europe would have no
immediate effect on the attitude of the courts. The belief that
pure legal principles are the only factors in reaching judicial de-
cisions is idealistic but highly unrealistic. Diversity cases in in-
ternational law federations should be adjudicated by federal
courts, the judges of which should assure a maximum imparti-
ality. There are many possible solutions. A suit between a
citizen of A and a citizen of B could be handled by a judge, citizen
of C. In a court where more than one judge would sit, the tri-
bunal could be composed of citizens of A, B, and C. The pro-
cedure and whole experience of "mixed commissions" could fur-
nish many suggestions.
It has been argued that under a properly drafted constitu-
tion, decisions of state courts, delivered under irrational bias,
should be subject to review by a federal supreme court on con-
stitutional grounds.7 4 This scheme, however, would offer only
slight, and in many cases, illusory protection to the party dis-
criminated against. First, because of the costs, troubles, and time
involved in litigation, the enormous majority of disputes, ad-
judicated in a court of first instance, never go further. On the
basis of some statistical data which are available, it is safe to
say that more than 90% of cases are never appealed. Second, the
decree in a case may be strictly conforming to law, and still in-
justice may be done. It will not appear from the record what
the attitude of the judge to the parties was, and anyhow his
rulings within the scope of his judicial discretion would not be
reviewable regardless of how prejudicial to a party, with the
possible exception of instances of clear abuse of discretion.
74 P. A. Freund, The Federal Judiciary, in Studies in Federalism by R. R.
Bowie and C. J. Friedrich 106, 114-115 (1954).
